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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Thung Van Huynh pleaded guilty in the United States 
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania to 
conspiracy to commit bank and wire fraud. The District Court 
sentenced Huynh to 70 months’ imprisonment in part based 
on its findings that he was subject to sentencing 
enhancements for being an organizer or leader of the 
conspiracy and for relocating the conspiracy to evade 
detection by the authorities. Huynh now argues that neither 
enhancement was warranted and that the Government 
breached its plea agreement with him at the sentencing 
hearing. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.  
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I 
 This case involves a scheme to fraudulently purchase 
luxury wristwatches at jewelry stores throughout the country. 
To finance the purchases, which totaled $815,553, Huynh and 
his co-conspirators used loans they obtained through identity 
theft. Huynh paid an employee of a California car dealership 
to give him identification and credit reporting information 
from customer records. Using the stolen information and 
photographs of his co-conspirators, Huynh arranged for 
counterfeit driver’s licenses and credit cards to be made in the 
victims’ names. 
At dozens of jewelry stores in 16 states, Huynh’s co-
conspirators used the counterfeit licenses and credit cards to 
apply to various financial institutions for credit in the amount 
of each watch purchase. Huynh then sold the watches to a 
woman in California who served as a fence for the scheme. 
Huynh used the proceeds to cover all of the scheme’s 
expenses and compensate his co-conspirators, keeping a share 
for himself. Huynh selected the jewelry stores, made all travel 
arrangements, and supplied his co-conspirators with the 
personal information of the defrauded individuals. On two 
occasions, law enforcement stopped Huynh around the time 
conspirators purchased watches. Specifically, Huynh and a 
co-conspirator were detained in Michigan at the United 
States-Canada border, where border agents “recovered the 
fraudulently obtained watches and counterfeit driver's 
licenses.” PSR ¶ 17. Huynh “falsely told the agents that he 
had purchased the watches with money won at the casinos.” 
Id. Two months later, Huynh and a different co-conspirator 
went to a store in Texas and attempted to purchase a luxury 
watch, but “store personnel alerted the police.” PSR ¶ 19. 
Huynh’s co-conspirator was arrested. Based upon information 
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from the store’s employees, a police officer approached 
Huynh, who was standing in the parking lot near the store. 
Huynh falsely told the officer he had no connection to the co-
conspirator. Huynh did not return to either Michigan or Texas 
after these interactions with law enforcement but continued to 
make fraudulent transactions in several other states. 
As part of a written agreement, Huynh pleaded guilty 
to conspiracy to commit bank and wire fraud in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 1349. Huynh and the Government stipulated as to 
how certain provisions of USSG § 2B1.1 (the Guideline for 
fraud-related offenses) applied to Huynh’s sentencing. In 
Paragraph 10 of the agreement, the parties stipulated to: a 
base offense level of seven under § 2B1.1(a)(1); a 12-level 
increase under § 2B1.1(b)(1)(G) based on the amount of loss; 
a two-level increase under § 2B1.1(b)(2)(A) based on the 
number of victims; and a two-level increase under 
§ 2B1.1(b)(11) because the scheme used an unlawfully 
produced means of identification. After a three-level 
reduction for acceptance of responsibility, Paragraph 10 
established Huynh’s total offense level at 20. At the same 
time, the Government reserved the right to seek an additional 
four-level enhancement under USSG § 3B1.1(a) for Huynh’s 
role as an “organizer or leader of a criminal activity that 
involved five or more participants or was otherwise 
extensive.” 
Also at issue in this appeal is the applicability of the 
two-level enhancement under Guidelines § 2B1.1(b)(10)(A) 
for relocating “a fraudulent scheme to another jurisdiction to 
evade law enforcement or regulatory officials.” Huynh’s plea 
agreement was silent as to the application of that 
enhancement, but the Government retained significant 
flexibility in responding to questions by the District Court and 
 5 
 
providing the Court with information the Government 
deemed relevant to the application of the Guidelines or other 
sentencing issues. The Presentence Investigation Report 
(PSR) prepared by the Probation Office applied the two-level 
“relocation” enhancement and the four-level “organizer or 
leader enhancement” to Huynh’s offense level. Huynh 
objected to both enhancements before sentencing. 
At the sentencing hearing, the District Court overruled 
both of Huynh’s objections. After determining that the plea 
agreement did not “specifically exclude” the relocation 
enhancement, the Court asked the Government for its position 
on the enhancement’s applicability. App. 17. The 
Government responded that it was “really taking no position” 
and did not “want to be viewed as undermining the plea 
agreement,” but noted that the agreement expressly provides 
that the Government was not restricted in responding to the 
Court’s questions regarding the application of the Guidelines. 
Id. The Court then repeated its question more specifically: did 
Huynh’s travel back and forth from his home in California to 
make fraudulent purchases at jewelry stores across the 
country constitute relocation under § 2B1.1(b)(10)(A)? In 
response, the Government offered an analysis of the facts and 
relevant caselaw that, in effect, supported Huynh’s principal 
argument. The Government agreed with Huynh that while 
“[m]ovement was integral to the conspiracy[,] . . . it was 
integral more for economic reasons than for evading law 
enforcement.” App. 19. Thereafter, the Government’s only 
significant comment on the enhancement was a confirmation, 
at the Court’s request, that the Court correctly understood that 
the scheme was focused primarily on locations in the eastern 
half of the country despite Rolex watches being sold 
nationwide. 
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After hearing Huynh’s arguments and reviewing the 
offense conduct as described in the PSR, which it adopted in 
full, the Court agreed with the Probation Office that the 
relocation enhancement applied. The Court based this 
determination on Huynh’s pattern of targeting jewelry stores 
at great distances from California and from one another, as 
well as specific instances of apparent efforts to evade 
detection by the authorities. The Court also overruled 
Huynh’s objection to the organizer or leader enhancement, 
agreeing with the Government that Huynh was the “leader 
and organizer of [the] group,” that the scheme involved the 
requisite five or more participants, and that even if it did not, 
it was “otherwise extensive,” as required by § 3B1.1(a). 
App. 28. As a result, Huynh’s final offense level was 26, and 
his Guidelines imprisonment range was 70 to 87 months. In 
addition to restitution and a special assessment, the District 
Court sentenced Huynh to 70 months’ imprisonment and 
three years of supervised release. Huynh filed a timely notice 
of appeal. 
II 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3231. We have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 
28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
 In general, “[w]e review the District Court’s 
application of the Guidelines to facts for abuse of discretion” 
and its factual findings for clear error. United States v. 
Tupone, 442 F.3d 145, 149 (3d Cir. 2006). But where the 
Guidelines “set[] forth a predominantly fact-driven test,” 
these two standards become indistinguishable, because we 
would find that the Court had “abused its discretion in 
applying the enhancement based on a particular set of facts 
 7 
 
only if those facts were clearly erroneous.” United States v. 
Richards, 674 F.3d 215, 223 (3d Cir. 2012). We have already 
held that the organizer or leader enhancement of § 3B1.1(a) 
sets forth such a fact-driven test. See United States v. Starnes, 
583 F.3d 196, 216–17 (3d Cir. 2009).  
As for the relocation enhancement of 
§ 2B1.1(b)(10)(A), we now hold that clear error review is 
appropriate because “the legal issue decided by the district 
court is, in essence, a factual question.” Richards, 674 F.3d at 
220. Whether or not a scheme was relocated to another 
jurisdiction to evade law enforcement or regulatory officials 
is, at bottom, “a strictly factual test, such that once the test is 
stated[,] no legal reasoning is necessary to the resolution of 
the issue.” Id. at 221 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting United States v. Brown, 631 F.3d 638, 644 (3d Cir. 
2011)). Was the scheme relocated? Was it relocated to evade 
the authorities? These are fact-intensive questions that the 
district courts, given their “relative institutional advantages,” 
are best equipped to answer. Id. We therefore review the 
District Court’s application of the relocation enhancement for 
clear error.   
By contrast, “[w]hether the government’s conduct 
violate[d] the terms of [a] plea agreement is a question of 
law[,] and our review is plenary.” United States v. 
Moscahlaidis, 868 F.2d 1357, 1360 (3d Cir. 1989).  
III 
 Huynh makes three arguments on appeal. First, he 
claims the Government breached the plea agreement when it 
failed to oppose the relocation enhancement. Second, he 
argues the enhancement did not apply because Huynh’s 
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travels did not constitute relocation of the scheme and were 
not intended to evade the authorities. Third, he contends the 
District Court erred in applying the organizer or leader 
enhancement because Huynh lacked the requisite “decision-
making authority,” the scheme involved fewer than five 
participants, and it was not “otherwise extensive,” as required 
by USSG § 3B1.1(a). Huynh Br. 15–19. We will address each 
argument in turn.  
A 
When assessing whether a plea agreement has been 
breached, we first “identify the terms of the agreement and 
the government’s alleged improper conduct,” and next 
“determine whether the government has violated its 
obligations under that agreement.” United States v. 
Davenport, 775 F.3d 605, 609 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing United 
States v. Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d 221, 235 (3d Cir. 
1998)). “[I]f it has, we fashion the proper remedy.”  Id. The 
core question guiding the analysis is “whether the 
government’s conduct [was] inconsistent with what was 
reasonably understood by the defendant when entering the 
plea of guilty.” Id. (quoting Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d at 236). 
This is a “purely objective standard governed by the common 
law of contract.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). “[W]e look to the plain meaning of the plea 
agreement and . . . give the benefit of any doubt to the 
defendant, given the government’s tremendous bargaining 
power in negotiating such plea agreements . . . and the fact 
that the defendant, by entering into the plea, surrenders a 
number of . . . constitutional rights.” Id. (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted). “[T]he Government must 
adhere strictly to the terms of the bargain[] it strikes,” United 
States v. Miller, 565 F.2d 1273, 1274 (3d Cir. 1977), and “we 
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will hold the government to that bargain,” Davenport, 775 
F.3d at 609.  
Huynh’s argument that the Government breached the 
plea agreement centers on Paragraph 10. He contends that the 
Paragraph’s stipulations to specific enhancements, coupled 
with its assignment of an offense level of 20, amounted to an 
exclusion of any other enhancements except for the organizer 
or leader enhancement, which the agreement acknowledged 
the Government would pursue. On Huynh’s view, it wasn’t 
enough for the Government to remain neutral; it had to 
affirmatively oppose the application of the relocation 
enhancement. Huynh insists the Government’s “initial failure 
to object [to the PSR] . . . , its failure to take a position at 
sentencing, and its acquiescence to the district court’s 
reasoning . . . should be construed as a clear breach of its 
agreement.” Huynh Br. 12 n.5.  
We disagree. As we explained in Davenport, “plea 
agreements ‘must be interpreted as a whole[,] and no part 
should be ignored.’” 775 F.3d at 610 (quoting United States v. 
Schwartz, 511 F.3d 403, 405 (3d Cir. 2008)). And this 
agreement included many provisions that put Huynh on 
notice that the stipulations did not carve his offense level into 
stone. As in Davenport, the same paragraph that listed the 
parties’ Guidelines stipulations also expressly reserved the 
Government’s right to supply to the District Court “all 
information in its possession which it deems relevant to the 
application of the Sentencing Guidelines to the defendant’s 
conduct.” App. 73. Further underscoring the Government’s 
discretion at sentencing, Paragraph 17 provided that the 
Government could “bring to the court’s attention . . . all 
relevant information with respect to the defendant’s 
background, character and conduct,” and Paragraph 18 
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allowed the Government to respond “to any request by the 
court for briefing, argument or presentation of evidence 
regarding the application of Sentencing Guidelines to the 
defendant’s conduct.” App. 80. The parties also noted that 
their stipulations did not bind the District Court or the 
Probation Office. Read objectively and in their full context, 
the stipulations in Paragraph 10 did not restrict the 
Government as Huynh suggests. The plea agreement nowhere 
required the Government to object to the PSR’s application of 
the relocation enhancement or to oppose it at sentencing.   
Our decision in Davenport is instructive here. In that 
case, which involved a plea agreement similar to Huynh’s, we 
concluded that there had been no breach despite the 
Government’s affirmative pursuit of an enhancement that had 
been stricken from the parties’ stipulations. 775 F.3d at 609–
11. Here, Huynh concedes that the Government never 
affirmatively pursued the relocation enhancement, and the 
record shows that the Government maintained neutrality 
throughout the sentencing hearing. Contrary to Huynh’s 
assertion, the Government did not “trigger[] the district 
court’s inquiry,” Reply Br. 6, into the enhancement’s 
applicability. Instead, the District Court raised the issue sua 
sponte, noting Huynh’s objection to the PSR and requesting 
argument on the issue. Only after the Court inquired did the 
Government make statements about the enhancement. And 
those statements were either factual or, to the extent they 
contained legal analysis, were consistent with Huynh’s 
arguments.  
In sum, the Government’s responses cannot fairly be 
understood as an attempt to circumvent the plea agreement in 
order to advocate for the enhancement’s application. See 
United States v. Larkin, 629 F.3d 177, 191 (3d Cir. 2010) 
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(concluding that no breach occurred where the government’s 
statements on an omitted enhancement’s applicability were 
limited to a “straightforward” presentation of legal issues and 
facts “well known to the District Court”).1 Accordingly, we 
hold that the Government did not breach the plea agreement.  
B 
We turn next to Huynh’s arguments on the merits of 
the District Court’s application of the relocation 
enhancement. The Guidelines provide that a base offense 
level may be increased by two levels if “the defendant 
relocated, or participated in relocating, a fraudulent scheme to 
another jurisdiction to evade law enforcement or regulatory 
officials.” USSG § 2B1.1(b)(10)(A). For the enhancement to 
apply, the defendant must have: (1) relocated a fraudulent 
                                                 
1 Huynh cites Nolan-Cooper in support of his 
contention that the Government’s statements improperly 
relied on the agreement’s general authorization to comment 
on the application of the Guidelines “to defeat a specific 
provision.” Huynh Br. 13. Huynh overlooks two critical 
elements of that case. First, the “specific provision” that we 
concluded had been breached expressly required that the 
government “not oppose” a particular sentencing position 
advanced by the defendant. Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d at 236. 
Second, the government in that case went beyond a neutral 
presentation of the relevant facts, effectively opposing the 
defendant’s position. Id. at 237. Neither of those facts is 
present here. 
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scheme from one jurisdiction to another, and (2) done so to 
evade law enforcement or regulatory officials. Id.2  
Huynh claims neither prong is satisfied. According to 
Huynh, the District Court mischaracterized the scheme’s 
movements as relocation when in fact Huynh was “simply 
operating a fraudulent scheme in multiple jurisdictions.” 
Reply Br. 5. Although multi-state schemes may involve 
cross-jurisdictional travel by their participants, Huynh argues 
that this is not the type of conduct the enhancement is 
intended to target. Instead, his scheme’s various “out-of-town 
trips,” all of which ended with Huynh returning home to 
California, reflected an “expansion of the conspiracy, not a 
relocation to avoid detection.” Huynh Br. 10. Huynh also 
disputes that he meets the second prong, arguing that, in the 
absence of specific evidence that the scheme was relocated 
“for the purpose of eluding law enforcement,” rather than for 
“economic reasons,” the enhancement does not apply. Reply 
Br. 4–5. Each of these arguments merits analysis. 
Critical to the District Court’s determination that 
Huynh had relocated the scheme was its observation that the 
stores Huynh and his co-conspirators targeted generally were 
located far away from California and each other. The Court 
found it significant that the “vast majority” of the stores were 
                                                 
2 The Guidelines and commentary do not define the 
term “relocate” or provide any further guidance regarding this 
provision, see USSG § 2B1.1 cmt. n.1 (“Definitions”), n.9 
(“Application of Subsection (b)(10)”). The dictionary defines 
“relocate” to mean “establish or lay out in a new place.” 
Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary, Unabridged (3d ed. 
1993). 
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in the eastern half of the country despite no shortage of stores 
selling luxury watches in California or elsewhere on the West 
Coast. App. 22. The targets chosen thus did not reflect mere 
expansion, in the Court’s view, but rather a deliberate effort 
to maximize the distance between the conspiracy’s home base 
and the places where its members most likely would raise 
suspicions.  
According to Huynh, these findings did not establish 
relocation because “operating in multiple jurisdictions was 
part of the larger conspiracy,” citing United States v. Hines-
Flagg, 789 F.3d 751 (7th Cir. 2015). Huynh Br. 10. The 
conspirators in Hines-Flagg made counterfeit identification 
documents in Detroit and used them at retail stores across 
several states to purchase merchandise on store credit 
accounts. Id. at 753. After each purchasing spree, the 
defendant and her nephew drove home to Detroit with the 
merchandise, which they either sold or kept for personal use. 
Id. at 754. The Seventh Circuit reversed, concluding that 
because it was “always meant to operate in multiple locations, 
with Detroit as its home base,” the scheme was “not 
‘relocated’ to Wisconsin, Ohio, and Illinois when [the 
defendant] traveled to those locations for temporary trips and 
returned to Detroit.” Id. 
Huynh’s reliance on Hines-Flagg is misplaced for two 
reasons. First, whereas Huynh’s targets were almost 
exclusively “half the country apart,” App. 22, the scheme in 
Hines-Flagg was limited to four contiguous states. We agree 
with Huynh that “mere geographic distance . . . is not 
dispositive,” Reply Br. 5, but the District Court did not 
clearly err in considering the geographic scope of the 
conspiracy and the dispersed nature of the locations to which 
the co-conspirators traveled when deciding whether to credit 
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Huynh’s claim that the scheme’s travels reflected only an 
expansion of its operations.3 Second, the Seventh Circuit 
reviewed the application of the enhancement in Hines-Flagg 
de novo, see 789 F.3d at 754–56, whereas our review is far 
more deferential. Quite unlike de novo review, we may deem 
a district court’s finding clearly erroneous only when we are 
“left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has 
been committed.” United States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 218 
(3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. 
v. Constr. Laborers Pension Tr. for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 622 
(1993)). Our review of the full record does not leave us with a 
conviction—much less a definite and firm one—that the 
District Court’s determination that the scheme was relocated 
was mistaken. 
Nor are we persuaded that the District Court clearly 
erred in finding that Huynh relocated the scheme for the 
purpose of evading the authorities. In support of his claim to 
the contrary, Huynh cites dicta in Hines-Flagg suggesting that 
                                                 
3 For the same reasons, this case is also distinguishable 
from a panel decision of the Eleventh Circuit that Huynh 
cites, United States v. Morris, 153 F. App’x 556 (11th Cir. 
2015). There, the court reversed a finding of relocation where 
the scheme’s stolen credit cards and driver’s licenses, all 
obtained in the greater Atlanta area, were used to make 
fraudulent purchases primarily in northern Georgia. Id. at 
558–59. Cf. United States v. Savarese, 686 F.3d 1, 15–16 (1st 
Cir. 2012) (rejecting defendants’ argument that despite trips 
throughout the country to withdraw fraudulent cash advances, 
their scheme was always firmly rooted in greater Boston and 
thus never relocated). 
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the “operation of a multi-jurisdictional scheme in order to 
reduce the chances of detection” is insufficient by itself to 
imply an intent to evade the authorities, 789 F.3d at 756. 
Even if we were to accept that premise, the record contains 
evidence—and the District Court made findings—supporting 
the conclusion that Huynh and his co-conspirators’ efforts to 
evade the authorities consisted of more than simply the act of 
operating in multiple jurisdictions. Citing among other facts 
the conspirators’ “driving to Nevada for purposes of flying 
out of Nevada to then go to the [E]ast [C]oast . . . , back 
sometimes to different airports,” the District Court stated that 
it found “ample evidence that the intent was we’ll go 
someplace other than where we are, where hopefully when 
we get our Rolex and we leave[,] we won’t have any 
additional concerns or problem with law enforcement because 
we’re not even around there, we don’t live in the same half of 
the country.” App. 21–22.  
Further supporting the District Court’s determination 
that the scheme was relocated to evade the authorities was 
Huynh’s decision, with one exception, to target each store 
only once. See Savarese, 686 F.3d at 16 n.12. (“The evidence 
supports an inference that the defendants avoided returning to 
the same health clubs and gambling establishments not 
because of any shortage of available credit cards and funds, 
but because the likelihood of detection would otherwise have 
increased substantially.”). 
Finally, the evidence concerning Huynh’s contacts 
with law enforcement and his actions thereafter support the 
inference that Huynh relocated the fraud scheme to evade law 
enforcement. Huynh was encountered by law enforcement on 
two separate occasions in two separate states; both incidents 
occurred during or shortly after Huynh and his co-
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conspirators engaged or attempted to engage in fraudulent 
transactions and Huynh did not return to either state but 
engaged in fraudulent transactions in other states. These facts 
support the reasonable inference that the co-conspirators 
stopped engaging in fraud in the places where they were 
confronted by law enforcement and “relocated” their fraud 
scheme to several other states following such confrontations 
so as to evade law enforcement. See United States v. Paredes, 
461 F.3d 1190, 1192 (10th Cir. 2006) (determining that the 
scheme relocated “to evade law enforcement” where 
fraudulently obtained goods “moved from Utah to Idaho 
because Utah became ‘hot’ after one of the [defendants] was 
arrested [there]”); United States v. Smith, 367 F.3d 737, 740 
(8th Cir. 2004) (concluding that the evidence established that 
the defendant—who operated a fraud scheme in Iowa and 
then moved permanently to Florida and began operating a 
fraud scheme there—moved in order to evade law 
enforcement where he had been arrested several times for 
fraud and other crimes in Iowa and a warrant for his arrest 
was outstanding in Iowa). 
 The District Court did not clearly err when it found 
that Huynh relocated the scheme and that he did so for the 
purpose of evading the authorities.  
C 
We next address Huynh’s argument that the District 
Court erred when it applied the organizer or leader 
enhancement. The Guidelines provide for a four-level 
increase in a base offense level if the defendant “was an 
organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or 
more participants or was otherwise extensive.” USSG 
§ 3B1.1(a). The commentary to § 3B1.1 does not define 
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“organizer or leader” but lists factors for sentencing courts to 
consider in determining whether a defendant qualifies as 
such. Those factors include  
the exercise of decision making authority, the 
nature of participation in the commission of the 
offense, the recruitment of accomplices, the 
claimed right to a larger share of the fruits of 
the crime, the degree of participation in 
planning or organizing the offense, the nature 
and scope of the illegal activity, and the degree 
of control and authority exercised over others. 
Id. cmt. n.4. “We have explained that to be considered an 
organizer or leader, the defendant must have exercised some 
degree of control over others in the commission of the 
offense.” United States v. Helbling, 209 F.3d 226, 243 (3d 
Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  
 Huynh argues that he was not an organizer or leader of 
the conspiracy for two reasons. First, he was an equal partner 
with co-conspirator Phil Nguyen, who was indicted separately 
and did not receive an organizer or leader enhancement. 
Huynh cites our decision in United States v. Katora, 981 F.2d 
1398 (3d Cir. 1992), for the proposition that the organizer or 
leader enhancement is inapplicable where “two 
participants . . . bear equal responsibility for the commission 
of crimes.” Huynh Br. 18. This selective citation does not 
help Huynh. In Katora, we held that the enhancement could 
not apply to a scheme in which there were only two 
participants, both of whom were “equally culpable,” because 
neither of them led the other and they had no additional 
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members to lead. 981 F.2d at 1405. Here, the conspiracy had 
additional members, so Katora is inapposite.4 
 Second, Huynh argues that he could not have been an 
organizer or leader of the scheme because he split its profits 
equally with his co-conspirators and did not exercise “any 
decision-making authority over the others . . . or control over 
assets.” Huynh Br. 18. This argument is undermined by the 
overwhelming evidence in the record demonstrating Huynh’s 
singular leadership role. It is not clear from the portion of the 
PSR Huynh cites that the profits were split equally among the 
co-conspirators, but even assuming he is correct on this score, 
it does not establish clear error by the District Court because 
the balance of the factors outlined in the commentary to 
§ 3B1.1 unequivocally support its finding that Huynh was an 
organizer or leader of the scheme. Specifically, the record 
indicates that Huynh recruited Tung Thanh Doan, John 
Nguyen, and Phil Nguyen to participate in the scheme. Huynh 
arranged for their counterfeit licenses and fraudulent credit 
cards to be made and then instructed the men to memorize the 
details of their fake identities. Huynh also took possession of 
the watches and the credit cards and licenses used to obtain 
them, decided which stores would be targeted, coordinated 
                                                 
4 Huynh’s suggestion that the decision of Nguyen’s 
sentencing court not to apply the enhancement somehow 
bound the District Court here to reach the same decision as to 
Huynh is without merit. Huynh also appears to suggest that 
two equally culpable individuals cannot both qualify as 
organizers or leaders. The commentary to USSG § 3B1.1 says 
otherwise. See § 3B1.1 cmt. n. 4 (“There can, of course, be 
more than one person who qualifies as a leader or organizer 
of a criminal association or conspiracy.”).  
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and paid for all travel, and controlled the scheme’s finances 
from start to finish.5 As the Probation Office noted in its 
response to Huynh’s objection to the PSR, “[i]t does not 
appear that the codefendants had any independent decision 
making ability in connection with the scheme.” PSR 
Addendum 3. Because Huynh exercised a significant “degree 
of control over others in the commission of the offense,” 
Helbling, 209 F.3d at 243, we hold that the District Court did 
not clearly err when it found Huynh to be an organizer or 
leader of the scheme.  
 Huynh also challenges the application of the 
enhancement on the ground that the scheme involved fewer 
than five participants and was not “otherwise extensive.” 
Under § 3B1.1, a participant is “a person who is criminally 
responsible for the commission of the offense, but need not 
have been convicted.” USSG § 3B1.1 cmt. n.1. Huynh does 
not dispute that at least three participants were involved (i.e., 
Huynh and his two co-defendants), and although he does not 
                                                 
5 Huynh cites several cases in which other courts of 
appeals reversed applications of an organizer or leader 
enhancement. See United States v. Jordan, 291 F.3d 1091 
(9th Cir. 2002); United States v. Parmelee, 42 F.3d 387 (7th 
Cir. 1994); United States v. Litchfield, 959 F.2d 1514 (10th 
Cir. 1992). The reversal of the enhancements in those cases 
was predicated on a lack of evidence in the record that the 
defendants had exercised sufficient decision making 
authority. See Jordan, 291 F.3d at 1098; Parmelee, 42 F.3d at 
395; Litchfield, 959 F.2d at 1523. Huynh’s role in initiating 
the scheme, his authority over its operations, and his 
responsibility for coordinating its every move all distinguish 
his case.  
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explicitly accept Phil Nguyen’s inclusion in the count, he 
effectively concedes the point by arguing that he and Nguyen 
were equal partners in the scheme. Huynh finds fault, 
however, with the District Court’s inclusion in the scheme of 
two unnamed individuals: the car dealership employee who 
supplied Huynh with the stolen customer information and the 
woman who fenced the watches. Huynh posits that those two 
actors should not have been counted because they were 
neither “identified in some capacity in the conspiracy” nor 
“necessary to the scheme.” Huynh Br. 16. 
 We need not reach the merits of these arguments, 
however, because we conclude that the District Court did not 
clearly err in finding that the scheme was otherwise extensive 
for purposes of § 3B1.1(a). In Helbling, we adopted a three-
step approach to determining whether a scheme is otherwise 
extensive. First, a sentencing court must distinguish the 
scheme’s “participants,” as defined by the commentary to 
§ 3B1.1, from non-participants who were nevertheless 
involved. 209 F.3d at 247–48. Next, the court must determine 
whether the defendant used each non-participant’s services 
“with specific criminal intent.” Id. at 248. Finally, the court 
must determine the extent to which those services were 
“peculiar and necessary to the criminal scheme.” Id. Non-
participants whom the defendant employed with specific 
criminal intent for services that were peculiar and necessary 
to the scheme may be counted as “functional equivalents” of 
participants. Id. If a scheme has a total of five or more 
participants and countable non-participants, it is “otherwise 
extensive.” Id.  
 Although Huynh complains that the Court did not 
explicitly undertake this three-step analysis at his sentencing 
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hearing,6 the Court’s specific factual findings, viewed in light 
of the entire record, suffice for us to determine that its 
conclusion was not clearly erroneous. In this case, assuming 
only the four undisputed participants, the involved non-
participants include the car dealership employee and the 
fence. Huynh does not dispute that he engaged both with the 
specific intent of furthering the aims of the conspiracy. And 
contrary to his suggestion, the record contains ample evidence 
that their services were necessary to the scheme’s success. 
Without the stolen identification and credit information the 
car dealership employee supplied to Huynh, the scheme could 
not have created the fake identities necessary to complete its 
fraudulent credit applications and purchases. And by 
purchasing the stolen watches from Huynh, the fence supplied 
the cash necessary to cover the scheme’s expenses and 
compensate its members. Huynh makes no attempt to show 
why these two individuals should not be counted as functional 
equivalents of participants, and we perceive no clear error in 
doing so. Because the sum of the scheme’s participants and 
countable non-participants exceeds five, we conclude that the 
District Court did not clearly err in finding that the scheme 
was otherwise extensive within the meaning of § 3B1.1(a). 
Accordingly, the Court did not clearly err in finding that 
                                                 
6 The District Court found that the scheme had at least 
five participants, rendering the “otherwise extensive” inquiry 
unnecessary. Its separate finding that the scheme was 
otherwise extensive was, as Huynh notes, not based on the 
Helbling factors outlined above. Coupled with the Court’s 
factual findings regarding whom it deemed to be participants 
for purposes of § 3B1.1(a), however, the record provides us 
with a sufficient basis on which to evaluate the Court’s 
finding for clear error. 
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Huynh was “an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that 
involved five or more participants or was otherwise 
extensive.” USSG § 3B1.1(a). 
IV 
 Because the Government did not breach its plea 
agreement with Huynh and the District Court did not clearly 
err when it applied the relocation and organizer or leader 
enhancements, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment 
of sentence. 
